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Real Harm in a Virtual World: Establishing
Federal Standing in the Seventh Circuit Under
Illinois’s Biometric Information Privacy Act
JULIA LOBO 1
Illinois became the first state to regulate the collection and use of biometric information by private entities when it enacted the Biometric Information Privacy Act in 2008. In the years since, more and more businesses have begun to collect biometric information from their employees and
customers. As lawmakers in other states and in Congress look to enact legislation to protect biometric privacy rights, their drafting choices may be
informed by three recent Seventh Circuit decisions analyzing when a plaintiff alleging a violation of the Biometric Information Privacy Act has, or
has not, established Article III standing as required to proceed in federal
court. This Note examines those three closely related decisions: Bryant v.
Compass Group USA, Inc., and Fox v. Dakkota Integrated Systems, LLC,
both decided in 2020, and Thornley v. Clearview AI, Inc., decided in early
2021.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Pay By Touch, a company that deployed fingerprint scanners to process payments in retail locations such as grocery stores and gas stations,
filed for bankruptcy in 2007. 2 As the bankruptcy proceedings progressed,
an ominous question arose: Would the company’s database of more than
two million fingerprint scans and associated financial information be sold to
the highest bidder? 3 Although the fingerprint database developed by Pay By
Touch was ultimately destroyed, the prospect of such a sale prompted the
Illinois General Assembly to pass legislation around the collection and use
of biometric information. 4
II.
A.

ILLINOIS’S BIOMETRIC INFORMATION PRIVACY ACT

SECTION 5 OF THE BIOMETRIC INFORMATION PRIVACY ACT:
LEGISLATIVE FINDINGS; INTENT

Illinois enacted the Biometric Information Privacy Act (BIPA) in
2008. 5 The section addressing legislative intent recalls the concerns raised
by the Pay By Touch bankruptcy proceedings:
The General Assembly finds all of the following:
(a) The use of biometrics is growing in the business and security screening sectors and appears to
promise streamlined financial transactions and security screenings.
(b) Major national corporations have selected the
City of Chicago and other locations in this State as
pilot testing sites for new applications of bio2. Lucy L. Thomson, Sensitive Personal Data for Sale in Bankruptcy—An Uncertain Future for Privacy Protection, 2017 NORTONS ANN. SURV. BANKR. L. 12.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/1 to 14/99 (2022).
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metric-facilitated financial transactions, including
finger-scan technologies at grocery stores, gas stations, and school cafeterias. 6
This section of the law closes with two observations that still ring true
more than a decade later, and which speak to the need for heightened protections around biometric information. Subsection 5(f) notes that “[t]he full
ramifications of biometric technology are not fully known,” and subsection
5(g) goes on to state that “[t]he public welfare, security, and safety will be
served by regulating the collection, use, safeguarding, handling, storage,
retention, and destruction of biometric identifiers and information.” 7
B.

SECTION 10 OF THE BIOMETRIC INFORMATION PRIVACY ACT:
DEFINITIONS

BIPA protects more than just fingerprints. The law defines biometric
information as “any information . . . based on an individual’s biometric
identifier used to identify an individual.” 8 And “biometric identifier,” as
defined in the text of BIPA, refers to “a retina or iris scan, fingerprint,
voiceprint, or scan of hand or face geometry.” 9
BIPA’s regulations and restrictions only apply to “private entities.”10
A private entity is defined in section 10 as “any individual, partnership,
corporation, limited liability company, association, or other group, however
organized.” 11 State or local government agencies are specifically excluded
from BIPA’s reach, as are “any court of Illinois, a clerk of the court, or a
judge or justice thereof.” 12
C.

SECTION 15 OF THE BIOMETRIC INFORMATION PRIVACY ACT:
RETENTION; COLLECTION; DISCLOSURE; DESTRUCTION

Section 15 contains the heart of the privacy regulations. 13 Subsection
15(a) requires “a written policy, made available to the public” that establishes the private entity’s schedule for the retention and destruction of biometric information. 14 The destruction of the biometric information must
occur as soon as the purpose of the collection has been satisfied, or within
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/5 (2022).
Id.
740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/10 (2022).
Id.
See 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/15 (2022).
740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/10 (2022).
Id.
740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/15 (2022).
740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/15(a) (2022).
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three years from the entity’s last interaction with the individual, whichever
occurs first. 15 Under 15(a), the entity must also comply with its written policy, unless the biometric information is the subject of a warrant or subpoena. 16
Subsection 15(b) sets out requirements for informed consent. 17 First,
the private entity must notify the individual in writing that it is collecting
biometric information. 18 Second, it must notify the individual of the specific purpose of the collection, as well as the length of time for which the information will be stored and used. 19 Third, the entity must obtain written
consent from the individual prior to collecting the information. 20
Subsection 15(d) outlines restrictions on the disclosure and dissemination of biometric information, 21 while subsection 15(e) requires private
entities to use a “reasonable standard of care” in protecting any biometric
information in its possession. 22 The measures used to protect biometric information must be “the same as or more protective than the manner in
which the private entity . . . protects other confidential and sensitive information.” 23
D.

SECTION 20 OF THE BIOMETRIC INFORMATION PRIVACY ACT: RIGHT OF
ACTION

Section 20 of BIPA gives the law its teeth. This section reads:
§ 20. Right of action. Any person aggrieved by a
violation of this Act shall have a right of action in a
State circuit court or as a supplemental claim in
federal district court against an offending party. A
prevailing party may recover for each violation:
(1) against a private entity that negligently violates
a provision of this Act, liquidated damages of
$1,000 or actual damages, whichever is greater;
(2) against a private entity that intentionally or
recklessly violates a provision of this Act, liquidated damages of $5,000 or actual damages, whichever is greater;
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

Id.
Id.
740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/15(b) (2022).
740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/15(b)(1) (2022).
740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/15(b)(2) (2022).
740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/15(b)(3) (2022).
740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/15(d) (2022).
740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/15(e) (2022).
Id.
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(3) reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs, including
expert witness fees and other litigation expenses;
and
(4) other relief, including an injunction, as the State
or federal court may deem appropriate. 24
This brief section of the law has given rise to many of the disputes
around BIPA. For example, what exactly does “aggrieved” mean? And how
might a plaintiff be aggrieved? Though the legislation was enacted in 2008,
these remained open questions for Illinois courts until 2019, when the
state’s supreme court ruled on a BIPA plaintiff’s standing to sue.
III. ROSENBACH: THE LANDMARK CASE
A.

THE ILLINOIS SUPREME COURT ADDRESSES STANDING REQUIREMENTS
FOR BIPA COMPLAINTS

In Rosenbach v. Six Flags Entertainment Corp., Six Flags Great
America theme park in Gurnee, Illinois, had taken the thumbprint of a 14year-old boy as part of its standard procedure for issuing season passes.25
Because the theme park failed to obtain informed consent as required by
section 15(b) of BIPA, the boy’s mother filed a complaint seeking damages
for the statutory violation as well as injunctive relief to ensure that the
theme park would obtain informed consent before collecting biometric information in the future. 26
Six Flags filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, arguing that the
plaintiff “had suffered no actual or threatened injury and therefore lacked
standing to sue.” 27 The Illinois trial court denied the motion to dismiss. 28
The appellate court granted the defendant’s request for review and held that
the plaintiff did not have standing to sue “based solely on a defendant’s
violation of the statute. Additional injury or adverse effect must be alleged.” 29 The plaintiff then appealed to the Illinois Supreme Court. 30
In a unanimous decision, the Illinois Supreme Court reversed the appellate court, ruling that the plaintiff did have standing to sue for the defendant’s BIPA violations. 31 In reaching this conclusion, the court looked to

5-7.

24.
25.

740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/20 (2022).
Rosenbach v. Six Flags Ent. Corp., 129 N.E.3d 1197, 1200, 2019 IL 123186, ¶¶

26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

Id. at 1201.
Id. at 1201-02.
Id. at 1202.
Id.
Rosenbach, 129 N.E.3d at 1202.
Id. at 1199-1200; see also id. at 1207.
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the plain language of the statute in order to ascertain the legislature’s intent. 32 The court stated that when a statutory term is not defined within the
statute, as is the case with BIPA’s use of the term aggrieved, the court will
assume that “the legislature intended for it to have its popularly understood
meaning.” 33 In addition, the court will look to the “settled legal meaning”
of the term. 34 And in this case, both of these approaches supported Rosenbach’s understanding of aggrieved. 35
Quoting a 1913 Illinois Supreme Court decision, the court stated that a
person is “aggrieved, in the legal sense, when a legal right is invaded by the
act complained of.” 36 Because that definition has since been so widely repeated by Illinois courts, the court said that it “must presume that the legislature was aware of that precedent and acted accordingly.” 37
This definition is consistent with the popular understanding of the
term. For example, one definition of aggrieved offered by MerriamWebster’s Collegiate Dictionary is “suffering from an infringement or denial of legal rights.” 38 Likewise, Black’s Law Dictionary defines aggrieved as
“having legal rights that are adversely affected.”39 Based on these dictionary definitions, the court again concluded that the legislature intended to
invoke this meaning when drafting the Biometric Information Privacy
Act. 40
By enacting BIPA, the Illinois legislature established that individuals
have a right to privacy in their biometric information. 41 Therefore, when a
company fails to comply with the requirements of BIPA, the company violates those privacy rights, and an affected individual is aggrieved and entitled to file suit under BIPA’s private right of action. 42
Furthermore, the idea that an individual could not file suit under BIPA
in the absence of actual damages is inconsistent with BIPA’s goal of preventing that sort of damage from occurring in the first place. Here, the court
pointed to the fact that the Illinois legislature “expressly noted that
‘[b]iometrics are unlike other unique identifiers . . . For example, social
security numbers, when compromised, can be changed. Biometrics, howev32. Id. at 1204.
33. Id. at 1205.
34. Rosenbach, 129 N.E.3d at 1205.
35. Id.
36. Id. (quoting Glos v. People, 102 N.E. 763, 766 (Ill. 1913)).
37. Id.
38. Id. (quoting Aggrieved, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (11th
ed. 2006)).
39. Rosenbach, 129 N.E.3d at 1205 (quoting Aggrieved, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY
(9th ed. 2009)).
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
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er, are biologically unique to the individual; therefore, once compromised,
the individual has no recourse.’” 43 How does BIPA seek to prevent this
irreversible damage? In two ways: First, by erecting safeguards around individuals’ privacy rights related to biometric information. 44 Second, by
imposing substantial potential liabilities on private entities who fail to comply with the requirements of BIPA. 45
In fact, “[o]ther than the private right of action . . . no other enforcement mechanism is available.” 46 And because BIPA can protect biometric
information privacy only if private entities have a strong incentive to follow
the law, the legislature must have meant for the private right of action “to
have substantial force.” 47 The court expanded on this point, saying that
[c]ompliance should not be difficult; whatever expenses a business might incur to meet the law’s requirements are likely to be insignificant compared
to the substantial and irreversible harm that could
result if biometric identifiers and information are
not properly safeguarded; and the public welfare,
security, and safety will be advanced. That is the
point of the law. To require individuals to wait until they have sustained some compensable injury
beyond violation of their statutory rights before
they may seek recourse, as defendants urge, would
be completely antithetical to the Act’s preventative
and deterrent purposes. 48
In Rosenbach, the Illinois Supreme Court established that, in Illinois
courts, a plaintiff “need not allege some actual injury or adverse effect, beyond violation of his or her rights under the Act, in order to qualify as an
‘aggrieved’ person and be entitled to seek liquidated damages and injunctive relief pursuant to the Act.” 49

43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Id. (quoting 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 14/5(c) (West 2016)).
Rosenbach, 129 N.E.3d at 1206-07. See 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/15 (2022).
Rosenbach, 129 N.E.3d at 1207. See 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/20 (2022).
Rosenbach, 129 N.E.3d at 1207.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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ROSENBACH AMICI BRIEF: ACLU ET AL. ARGUE FOR PLAINTIFF’S
STANDING TO SUE

When the Illinois Supreme Court accepted the Rosenbach case for review, it also accepted “friend of the court” briefs in support of both the
plaintiff and the defendant. 50 The amici brief submitted by the American
Civil Liberties Union (“ACLU”) et al. explained that the ACLU, along with
the ACLU of Illinois, had drafted BIPA and had been “instrumental to its
passage.” 51 The brief urged the Illinois Supreme Court to hold that Rosenbach did have standing to sue in Illinois state court, arguing that, if the court
found she did not have standing, the ruling would “significantly undermine
the private enforcement mechanism of the statute, . . . leaving no means to
hold wrongdoers accountable for their violations of BIPA’s notice and consent requirements.” 52
The ACLU’s brief stressed the importance of enforcing BIPA’s protections for individuals in the face of dangers such as the surreptitious collection of biometric data, particularly as related technologies continue to
advance. 53 For example, at the time the brief was written, the technology
already existed to “conduct iris scans at a distance of up to 12 meters, eliminating the need for people to place their eye directly in front of an eyescanning camera or even to be aware that the scanning is taking place.”54
Illinois residents would be protected from such invasive and clandestine
practices only if BIPA’s requirements for notice could be effectively enforced. 55
And while the data collection at issue in the Rosenbach case was not
surreptitious, it occurred in the type of “functionally nonvoluntary” context
contemplated by the legislators who enacted BIPA. 56 The requirement for
informed consent ensures not only that individuals are aware that biometric
information is being collected, but also that they are made aware of the
terms of that collection prior to surrendering their biometric information. 57
A violation of BIPA’s notice and consent requirements impairs an individual’s ability to protect and control personal biometric data and therefore

50. Id. at 1202.
51. Brief for ACLU et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Plaintiff-Appellant, Rosenbach v. Six Flags Ent. Corp., 129 N.E.3d 1197 (Ill. 2019), (No. 123186), 2018 WL 577921.
52. Id. at 4.
53. Id. at 8.
54. Id. at 7.
55. Id. at 8.
56. Brief for ACLU et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Plaintiff-Appellant at 16,
Rosenbach v. Six Flags Ent. Corp., 129 N.E.3d 1197, 2019 IL 123186 (No. 123186), 2018
WL 5777921.
57. Id.
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“creates an actionable privacy harm.” 58 In other words, a violation of
BIPA’s substantive requirements is not merely a bare procedural violation;
rather, “the right of the individual to maintain her biometric privacy vanishes into thin air. “The precise harm the Illinois legislature sought to prevent
is then realized.” 59
C.

ROSENBACH AMICUS BRIEF: THE ILLINOIS CHAMBER OF COMMERCE
ARGUES AGAINST PLAINTIFF’S STANDING TO SUE

The Illinois Chamber of Commerce (“Chamber”), an advocate for Illinois businesses, authored one of the briefs filed in support of Six Flags. 60 In
its brief, the Chamber warned that, should the Illinois Supreme Court hold
that Rosenbach had standing to sue, similar complaints seeking “catastrophic damages” would drive businesses “either out of Illinois or into
bankruptcy,” thereby damaging the state’s economy. 61
The Chamber argued that complaints such as Rosenbach’s sought to
impose “strict-liability on Illinois businesses for technical violations of
BIPA,” which would allow plaintiffs to sue in the absence of harm, and that
“the result would be devastating to Illinois businesses.” 62 The Chamber
urged the court to instead uphold the appellate court’s ruling that a plaintiff
“must allege some actual harm” in order to sue for a violation of BIPA. 63
As stated in the Rosenbach decision from the Illinois Appellate Court for
the Second District, “[i]f a person alleges only a technical violation of the
Act without alleging any injury or adverse effect, then he or she is not aggrieved and may not recover under any of the provisions” of BIPA. 64
In contrast to the ACLU’s argument that BIPA was intended to create
robust privacy protections for individuals, the Chamber construed the purpose of the legislation more narrowly. The Chamber quoted a decision from
the Southern District of New York, which stated that BIPA was meant “to
ensure that, when an individual engages in a biometric-facilitated transaction, the private entity protects the individual’s biometric data, and does not
use that data for an improper purpose, especially a purpose not contemplat-

58. Id. at 11.
59. Id. at 17 (quoting Patel v. Facebook, Inc., 290 F. Supp. 3d 948, 954 (N.D. Cal.
2018)).
60. Brief for Amicus Curiae Illinois Chamber of Commerce Supporting Defendants-Appellees, Rosenbach v. Six Flags Ent. Corp., 129 N.E.3d 1197, 2019 IL 123186 (No.
123186), 2018 WL 5777926.
61. Id. at 1-2.
62. Id. at 1.
63. Id. at 2.
64. Id. at 4 (quoting Rosenbach v. Six Flags Ent. Corp., 147 N.E.3d 125, 131, 2017
IL App (2d) 170317, ¶ 28).
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ed by the underlying transaction.” 65 Or, as stated by the Chamber, BIPA
was enacted to guard against “the improper disclosure and sale of consumers’ biometric data — not to impose strict liability on Illinois businesses.” 66
The Chamber went on to argue that reversing the appellate court’s decision in Rosenbach would “open the floodgates for future litigation” and
create an existential threat to small businesses in Illinois. 67 While biometric
technology is often utilized by Illinois businesses so that employees cannot
clock in or clock out for coworkers, those same companies lack the financial resources to survive BIPA lawsuits. 68
Next, the Chamber turned to the potentially “devastating damages”
that could be obtained by plaintiffs for BIPA violations. 69 While section 20
of BIPA lists damages at a minimum of $1,000 for each negligent violation
and $5,000 for each reckless violation of the Act, damages could quickly
escalate if each and every fingerprint scan counted as a violation.70 For example, an employee might use a fingerprint scanner four times a day: clocking in at the start of the day, clocking out for lunch, clocking in after lunch,
and then clocking out for the day. 71 In addition, the Chamber said, plaintiffs
in class action suits have sought to apply a five-year statute of limitations
(the “catch-all” statute of limitations in Illinois) because BIPA does not list
its own statute of limitations. 72
The Chamber went on to calculate potential damages for companies of
various sizes. 73 Assuming $1,000 per violation, with each employee scanning a fingerprint four times a day while working five days a week, fifty
weeks a year, for five years, companies would owe $5 million per employee. 74 A company with twenty employees could be faced with $100 million
in damages, while a company with 1,000 employees would face $5 billion
in damages. 75 The Chamber then concluded that “many Illinois businesses

65. Brief for Amicus Curiae Illinois Chamber of Commerce Supporting Defendants-Appellees, supra note 60, at 3 (quoting Vigil v. Take-Two Interactive Software, Inc.,
235 F. Supp. 3d 499, 520 (S.D.N.Y. 2017)).
66. Id. at 2.
67. Id. at 4-5.
68. Id. at 5-6.
69. Id. at 8.
70. Brief for Amicus Curiae Illinois Chamber of Commerce Supporting Defendants-Appellees, supra note 60, at 8-9.
71. Id. at 9.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 10.
74. Id.
75. Brief of Amicus Curiae Illinois Chamber of Commerce in Support of Defendants-Appellees at 10, Rosenbach v. Six Flags Ent. Corp., (Ill. 2019) (No. 123186), 2018 WL
5777926.

298

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42-2

may be forced to settle for significant amounts,” which in turn would harm
the state’s economy, “to the ultimate detriment of all Illinois residents.”76
IV. CLEARVIEW AI: BIOMETRIC PRIVACY CONCERNS IN THE
NATIONAL SPOTLIGHT
The Illinois Supreme Court ruled on the Rosenbach case in January
2019. A year later, in January 2020, the New York Times put biometric privacy concerns in the national spotlight with the publication of an article
titled “The Secretive Company That Might End Privacy As We Know It.” 77
While the Pay By Touch bankruptcy raised the possibility of a private company profiting from biometric information, this article showed that, more
than a decade later, it had become a reality. The article focused on a littleknown company called Clearview AI, which had provided both clients and
potential clients with access to its “groundbreaking facial recognition app”
that allows users to upload a photo of an unidentified person and run it
through a database of more than three billion images to find potential
matches. 78 Clearview created the breathtakingly vast database, which “goes
far beyond anything ever constructed by the United States government or
Silicon Valley giants,” by collecting photos of faces along with identifying
information from “Facebook, YouTube, Venmo and millions of other websites.” 79
When New York Times analysts reviewed the computer code behind
the Clearview app, they uncovered “programming language to pair [the
app] with augmented-reality glasses,” suggesting that Clearview clients
might someday be able to surreptitiously identify nearly any person on the
street, such as “activists at a protest or an attractive stranger on the subway,
revealing not just their names but where they lived, what they did and
whom they knew.” 80
Who might be on Clearview’s list of clients? According to Clearview,
the Indiana State Police became its first customer in February 2019. 81 And
in the year that followed, more than six hundred law enforcement agencies
joined the client list, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the
76.
77.

Id. at 11-12.
Kashmir Hill, The Secretive Company That Might End Privacy As We Know It,
N.Y.
TIMES
(updated
Feb.
10,
2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/18/technology/clearview-privacy-facial-recognition.html
[https://perma.cc/B77H-QJUW].
78. Id.
79. Id. (emphasis added). Note that “Facebook and other social media sites prohibit
people from scraping users’ images — Clearview is violating the sites’ terms of service.” Id.
80. Id.
81. Hill, supra note 77.
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Department of Homeland Security. 82 The following anecdote demonstrates
the app’s utility for law enforcement agencies:
[The Indiana State Police] solved a case within 20
minutes of using the app. Two men had gotten into
a fight in a park, and it ended when one shot the
other in the stomach. A bystander recorded the
crime on a phone, so the police had a still of the
gunman’s face to run through Clearview’s app.
[The police] immediately got a match: The man
appeared in a video that someone had posted on
social media, and his name was included in a caption on the video. “He did not have a driver’s license and hadn’t been arrested as an adult, so he
wasn’t in government databases,” said Chuck Cohen, an Indiana State Police captain at the time.
The man was arrested and charged; Mr. Cohen said
he probably wouldn’t have been identified without
the ability to search social media for his face. 83
In addition to an immense database of potential matches, Clearview
offers facial recognition technology that is more robust than governmentissued facial recognition software. For example, the app can find a match
even if the suspect is wearing a hat or glasses, or isn’t looking toward the
camera. 84
Soon after the publication of the New York Times article, BuzzFeed
News reported that Clearview had provided its services (or at least a free
trial) to employees at more than two hundred private companies, including
Walmart, Best Buy, and Wells Fargo. 85 The client log reviewed by
BuzzFeed listed Macy’s department store, for example, as a paying customer with more than six thousand searches conducted through its account,
placing Macy’s among the private companies with the most searches. 86

82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Ryan Mac et al., Clearview’s Facial Recognition App Has Been Used by the
Justice Department, ICE, Macy’s, Walmart, and the NBA, BUZZFEED NEWS (Feb. 27, 2020),
https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/ryanmac/clearview-ai-fbi-ice-global-lawenforcement [https://perma.cc/DK52-GYWJ].
86. Id.
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BuzzFeed later reported that Macy’s had terminated its contract with Clearview AI in January 2020, according to a company spokesperson. 87
The New York Times article didn’t just bring media attention to this
“secretive company”; in addition, a “rash of lawsuits followed in the wake
of the article.” 88 By May 2020, Clearview found itself fighting a motion for
a preliminary injunction in Mutnick v. Clearview AI, Inc.89 In its motion
filed with the United States District Court in the Northern District of Illinois, Clearview outlined the ways it had voluntarily taken steps to comply
with the requirements of BIPA. 90
Arguing that its voluntary actions rendered the request for an injunction moot, Clearview stated that it had “recently and voluntarily changed its
business practices to avoid including data from Illinois residents and to
avoid transacting with non-governmental customers anywhere.” 91 The
company went on to say that it was “cancelling the accounts of every customer who was not either associated with law enforcement or some other
federal, state, or local government department, office, or agency . . . [and]
all accounts belonging to any entity based in Illinois.” 92 In addition, the
company stated that it had taken steps to block access “to Illinois Information until the conclusion of these litigations” and had updated its terms
of use to prohibit “users from uploading images of Illinois residents.” 93
V. BIPA PROTECTIONS AND CONCRETE INJURIES: THE
QUESTION OF FEDERAL STANDING REACHES THE SEVENTH
CIRCUIT
When BIPA took effect in 2008, Illinois became the first state in the
country to regulate issues around biometric information privacy. 94 Howev87. Ryan Mac et al., Clearview AI Has Promised to Cancel All Relationships With
Private
Companies,
BUZZFEED
NEWS
(May
7,
2020),
https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/ryanmac/clearview-ai-no-facial-recognition-privatecompanies [https://perma.cc/8E4Z-E2AN].
88. Thornley v. Clearview AI, Inc., 984 F.3d 1241, 1243 (7th Cir. 2021) (providing
background for defendant, Clearview AI, Inc.). “See, e.g., Mutnick v. Clearview AI, Inc., No.
1:20-cv-00512 (N.D. Ill.); Roberson v. Clearview AI, Inc., No. 1:20-cv-00111 (E.D.
Va.); Calderon v. Clearview AI, Inc., No. 1:20-cv-01296 (S.D.N.Y.); Burke v. Clearview AI,
Inc., No. 3:20-cv-00370 (S.D. Cal.). This case was one of them.” Id.
89. Clearview Defendants’ Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction, Mutnick v. Clearview AI, Inc., No. 20-cv-512 (N.D. Ill. May
6, 2020).
90. Id. at 1.
91. Id. at 3.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 6-7.
94. JOHN M. FITZGERALD, GUIDE TO THE ILLINOIS BIOMETRIC INFORMATION PRIVACY
ACT 5-6 (2020).
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er, the new legislation was largely ignored for the next seven years. 95 It was
not until December 2015 that a reported judicial decision addressed a BIPA
complaint. 96 Since then, BIPA has become “arguably the fastest-growing
and most-discussed area of civil litigation in Illinois,” and has led to “massive class action litigation in far-flung parts of the country.” 97 With plaintiffs filing BIPA complaints in Illinois state courts, only to have cases removed to federal court by defendants, it wasn’t long before federal courts
were put in the unusual position of hearing plaintiffs argue that they lacked
federal standing, while defendants asserted that the standing requirements
were satisfied. Three such cases are discussed below.
A.

BRYANT V. COMPASS GROUP USA, INC.

In Bryant v. Compass Group USA, Inc., a call center in Illinois installed vending machines owned by Compass Group USA, Inc. (“Compass”) in its employee cafeteria. 98 The vending machines relied on pay-bytouch technology, scanning a fingerprint to deduct funds from a linked account, and did not accept cash. 99 During orientation at the call center, Christine Bryant and other new hires were instructed to submit scans of their
fingerprints and create user accounts for the vending machines.100 Compass
did not have publicly available policies for the retention and destruction of
the fingerprints scans, as required by section 15(a) of BIPA. 101 Nor did
Compass obtain informed consent from Bryant, as required by section 15(b)
of BIPA. 102 Although Bryant scanned her fingerprint and used the vending
machines voluntarily, Compass’s failure to comply with BIPA meant that
she lost the opportunity to make an informed decision as to whether or not
to give Compass control of her biometric information. 103
Bryant filed a complaint against Compass in the Cook County Circuit
Court. 104 Because the complaint was a putative class action, Compass used
the Class Action Fairness Act to remove the case to federal court on the
95. Id. at 5.
96. Id. (citing Norberg v. Shutterfly, Inc., 152 F. Supp. 3d 1103 (N.D. Ill. 2015)).
97. Id. (citing, e.g., Patel v. Facebook, Inc., 932 F.3d 1264 (9th Cir. 2019)). This
class action ultimately settled for $650 million. See Robert Channick, Nearly 1.6 Million
Illinois Facebook Users to Get About $350 Each in Privacy Settlement, CHI. TRIB. (Jan. 14,
2021, 8:04 PM), https://www.chicagotribune.com/business/ct-biz-facebook-privacysettlement-illinois-20210115-2gau5ijyjff4xd2wfiiow7yl4m-story.html.
98. Bryant v. Compass Grp. USA, Inc., 958 F.3d 617, 619 (7th Cir. 2020).
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Bryant, 958 F.3d at 620.
104. Id.
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basis of diversity of citizenship and amount in controversy. 105 Bryant then
asserted that, “because she lacked the concrete injury-in-fact necessary to
satisfy the federal requirement for Article III standing,” the case should be
remanded to state court. 106 The federal district court sided with Bryant, ruling that the complaint alleged “bare procedural violations,” which were
insufficient to establish federal standing. 107 The Northern District of Illinois
remanded the case to state court and Compass appealed. 108
The Seventh Circuit accepted the appeal, noting in its decision that,
“[a]s the party invoking federal jurisdiction, Compass bears the burden of
establishing Bryant’s Article III standing . . . . This fact has occasioned a
role reversal in the arguments we normally see in these cases, with the defendant insisting that Article III standing is solid, and the plaintiff casting
doubt on it.” 109 The court then went on to identify the central issue: “For
Bryant to have Article III standing . . . she must have suffered an actual or
imminent, concrete and particularized injury-in-fact.” 110 Citing the 2016
Supreme Court decision in Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, the court further explained that an injury can be concrete even if it is intangible.111
Compass argued that the Rosenbach decision, although it addressed a
plaintiff’s standing only in Illinois state court, supports an argument for
federal standing as well. 112 Rosenbach had a right to control and protect the
biometric information that had been gathered, a right which the Illinois
General Assembly sought to protect by passing BIPA. 113 Because a violation of BIPA is a violation of those rights, Bryant, like Rosenbach, suffered
a “real and significant” injury. 114
While acknowledging that the reasoning in Rosenbach may be helpful,
the Seventh Circuit stated that “we cannot uncritically assume perfect overlap between the question before the state court and the one before us.” 115
The court went on to explain that, although both federal courts and Illinois
courts require an “injury in fact,” Illinois courts define the term differently,
and, as a result, standing requirements in Illinois courts are not as stringent
as federal requirements for Article III standing. 116
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Bryant, 958 F.3d at 620.
Id.
Id. at 620-21.
Id. at 621 (citing Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016)).
Id. at 621.
Bryant, 958 F.3d at 621.
Id. at 621-22.
Id. at 622.
Id.
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The court then turned to three previous federal circuit court decisions
in BIPA cases, noting that “none has decided the precise standing question
presented here.” 117 The Seventh Circuit, in its 2019 decision in Miller v.
Southwest Airlines Co., had held that union airline workers who had been
required to clock in and clock out with fingerprint scans had federal standing for complaints alleging violations of BIPA sections 15(a) and 15(b). 118
The Ninth Circuit, in its 2019 decision in Patel v. Facebook, Inc., had found
that plaintiffs had alleged an injury-in-fact by claiming that Facebook violated BIPA when it deployed facial-recognition technology without users’
informed consent. 119 In 2017, a nonprecedential summary order from the
Second Circuit had gone the other way. 120 In Santana v. Take-Two Interactive Software, Inc., where the plaintiff had explicitly consented to the facial
scan used to create a personalized game avatar, but the defendant had failed
to include every term required by BIPA for informed consent, 121 the Second
Circuit reasoned that the plaintiff lacked federal standing because the “procedural violations” of BIPA did not create “a material risk of harm” to the
plaintiff’s privacy interests.122 In addition, the Second Circuit noted that the
parties’ arguments over federal standing were “based on differing constructions of the term ‘aggrieved party’ as used in BIPA,” 123 a reminder that the
Santana decision predated the Illinois Supreme Court’s Rosenbach decision.
Next, the court listed BIPA cases that had been decided in the Northern District of Illinois, stating that “[t]he majority of the district courts in
this circuit have rejected standing for plaintiffs alleging only violations of
sections 15(a) and (b), without some further harm.” 124 The Seventh Circuit
observed that it was not bound by the district court decisions, and also noted that those decisions “did not rest on the nature of the interest BIPA seeks
to protect” and that, therefore, Bryant presented “a question of first impression.” 125
To answer this question, the court began by taking a closer look at the
Spokeo case because it “provides substantial guidance about cases alleging
117. Id.
118. Bryant, 958 F.3d at 622 (citing Miller v. Southwest Airlines Co., 926 F.3d 898
(7th Cir. 2019)).
119. Id. (citing Patel v. Facebook, Inc., 932 F.3d 1264 (9th Cir. 2019)).
120. Id. at 623 (citing Santana v. Take-Two Interactive Software, Inc., 717 F. App’x
12, 14 (2d Cir. 2017)).
121. Santana v. Take-Two Interactive Software, Inc., 717 F. App’x 12, 14 (2d Cir.
2017).
122. Id. at 15.
123. Id. at 17.
124. Bryant, 958 F.3d at 623.
125. Id.
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the kind of intangible harm to personal interests that Bryant asserts.” 126 In
Spokeo, the plaintiff alleged injuries caused by inaccuracies in his personal
information reported by a “people search engine.” 127 The federal district
court dismissed his complaint, ruling that he lacked Article III standing. 128
The Ninth Circuit reversed the decision, and the Supreme Court later accepted the case for review. 129
The Supreme Court ultimately did not decide whether or not the plaintiff in Spokeo had established federal standing; the Court ruled only that the
Ninth Circuit had used the wrong standard in its analysis. 130 The Ninth Circuit’s analysis had focused on whether the plaintiff had suffered a particularized harm, which the Supreme Court held was necessary but not sufficient. 131 To establish standing, the plaintiff’s injury needed to be both particularized and concrete. 132 The Court went on to explain that “[a]lthough
tangible injuries are perhaps easier to recognize . . . intangible injuries can
nevertheless be concrete,” and that “the risk of real harm can suffice, and
injury-in-fact is not defeated just because the injury is ‘difficult to prove or
measure.’” 133
For further guidance, the Seventh Circuit looked to Justice Thomas’s
concurrence in Spokeo, where he drew a distinction between complaints
that allege a violation of the plaintiff’s own rights (e.g., trespass or infringements on intellectual property) and complaints that allege a violation
of the rights of the public (e.g., public nuisance or disputed use of public
land). 134 The Seventh Circuit then concluded that Bryant’s complaint alleged “an invasion of her private domain, much like an act of trespass,” and
that this invasion was sufficient to establish injury-in-fact, as required by
Article III. 135
The Seventh Circuit stated that, alternatively, Bryant’s standing could
be established by viewing her alleged injuries as “a type of informational
injury.” 136 Under this analysis, the key issue is whether “the plaintiff is entitled to receive and review substantive information.” 137 Applying this standard to the Bryant case, the court held that standing would be established
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
2018)).

Id. (citing Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016)).
Id. (citing Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016)).
Id. (citing Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016)).
Bryant, 958 F.3d at 623 (citing Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016)).
Id. (citing Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016)).
Id. at 624 (citing Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016)).
Id. (citing Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016)).
Id. (citing Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1549 (2016)).
Bryant, 958 F.3d at 624 (citing Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016)).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 625 (quoting Robertson v. Allied Sols., LLC, 902 F.3d 690, 697 (7th Cir.
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based on “the substantive and personal nature of the information Compass
was obligated under BIPA to disclose to consumers such as Bryant.” 138 By
enacting section 15(b) of BIPA, the Illinois General Assembly sought to
protect highly sensitive personal information by ensuring that individuals
would “be given the opportunity to make informed choices about to whom
and for what purpose” they would share their biometric information. 139 By
failing to comply with section 15(b), Compass denied Bryant the opportunity to weigh the potential risks against the conveniences of sharing her fingerprint with the company. 140 Depriving Bryant of her right to make an
informed decision amounts to an injury that is both concrete and particularized, as required for Article III standing. 141
Having determined that Bryant had federal standing for her claim related to section 15(b), which the court identified as “the heart of BIPA,” the
court then turned to a different issue—whether Bryant had federal standing
for her claim related to section 15(a). 142 Because Bryant’s complaint cited
only the first half of section 15(a) (which requires companies to have a publicly available policy for retention and destruction of biometric information), the court did not include in its analysis the second half of 15(a)
(which requires companies to comply with those publicly available policies). 143
Importantly, Bryant’s claim related to section 15(a) alleged the breach
of a duty owed to the general public, and she did not allege any particularized harm. 144 Therefore, the court quickly concluded that Bryant’s section
15(a) claim had not alleged a concrete, particularized injury, and so she did
not have Article III standing for that portion of her complaint. The court
went on to state that it had “no authority and no occasion to address her
state-court standing” for the claim under section 15(a). 145
B.

FOX V. DAKKOTA INTEGRATED SYSTEMS, LLC

The Seventh Circuit affirmed and further clarified the Bryant holding
regarding federal standing for section 15(a) claims in Fox v. Dakkota Integrated Systems, LLC. 146 Fox had sued her former employer in state court for
alleged BIPA violations stemming from the employer’s requirement that
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.

Id. at 626.
Bryant, 958 F.3d at 626.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Bryant, 958 F.3d at 626.
Id.
Fox v. Dakkota Integrated Sys., LLC, 980 F.3d 1146 (7th Cir. 2020).
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employees clock in and clock out by placing a hand on a biometric scanner. 147 The defendant employer removed the proposed class action suit to
federal court where the judge remanded the section 15(a) claim to state
court, citing the Seventh Circuit’s Bryant decision. 148
The Seventh Circuit reversed the district court’s decision to remand
the claim under section 15(a), explaining that the Bryant holding was “quite
limited.” 149 Its decision regarding federal standing for Bryant’s section
15(a) claim had even been accompanied by a warning: “We cautioned that
our analysis was confined to the narrow violation the plaintiff alleged; we
did not address standing requirements for claims under other parts of section 15(a).” 150
As noted in the above synopsis of the Bryant case, Bryant’s complaint
cited only the first half of section 15(a), which states that the “private entity
in possession of biometric identifiers or biometric information must develop a written policy, made available to the public, establishing a retention
schedule and guidelines for permanently destroying biometric identifiers
and biometric information.” 151 In contrast, Fox’s complaint also included an
allegation that the employer had failed to comply with the second half of
section 15(a), which states that “a private entity in possession of biometric
identifiers or biometric information must comply with . . . retention schedule
and destruction guidelines.” 152 Because Fox alleged that her former employer was wrongfully retaining her biometric information, the section
15(a) violation was not “a mere procedural failure to publicly disclose a
data-retention policy” but rather an “invasion of a legally protected
right.” 153 The resulting injury, “though intangible, is personal and real, not
general and abstract.” 154
In distinguishing the Fox decision from an earlier Seventh Circuit decision regarding the protection of personal information such as home address and phone number, the court emphasized the particularly sensitive
nature of biometric information. 155 By enacting BIPA, the Illinois legislature intended to create robust protections for biometric identifiers “because
they are immutable, and once compromised, are compromised forever.” 156

147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.

Id. at 1149.
Id. at 1150-51.
Id. at 1148-49.
Id.
740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/15(a) (2021) (emphasis added).
Id. (emphasis added).
Fox, 980 F.3d at 1149.
Id.
Id. at 1155.
Id.
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THORNLEY V. CLEARVIEW AI, INC.

Informed by the Seventh Circuit’s decisions in Bryant and Fox, a
plaintiff might succeed in stating a BIPA claim that satisfies the standing
requirements in Illinois state court but falls short of the standing requirements for federal court, thereby ensuring that a lawsuit filed in state court
remains in state court. For example, in Thornley v. Clearview AI, Inc., the
plaintiffs had filed a putative class action in Illinois state court, alleging that
Clearview had secretly performed facial scans on photographs posted to the
internet in order to create a facial recognition database, and then profited
from the sale of that biometric data. 157 However, the plaintiffs did not base
the complaint on BIPA section 15(b), which requires written consent to the
collection of biometric information; instead, the plaintiffs brought only one
claim against the defendant: a violation of BIPA section 15(c), which prohibits private companies from selling biometric information. 158 Further, the
plaintiffs specified that “no class member, ‘suffered any injury as a result of
the violations of Section 15(c) of BIPA other than . . . statutory aggrievement.’” 159
After Clearview removed the case to federal court, the plaintiffs argued that they lacked standing to proceed in federal court while Clearview
countered that the plaintiffs did have standing. 160 The federal district court
sided with the plaintiffs and remanded the case to state court. 161 On appeal,
the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision to remand Thornley to state court. 162 After laying out the facts and procedural history of the
case, the court listed the requirements for federal standing and explained
that its analysis here would focus exclusively on the requirement that the
plaintiff demonstrate “an injury in fact that is concrete, particularized, and
actual or imminent.” 163
The court next revisited its previous rulings on BIPA cases, including
Bryant 164 and Fox, 165 both discussed above. The court highlighted the fact
that Bryant’s claim under section 15(a) was not sufficient to establish federal standing because she alleged only a violation of a duty that was owed
to the public; in contrast, Fox’s claim under section 15(a) was sufficient to
establish federal standing because she alleged an injury particular to her157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

Thornley v. Clearview AI, Inc., 984 F.3d 1241, 1246 (7th Cir. 2021).
Id. at 1246.
Id. (quoting the complaint).
Id. at 1242.
Id.
Thornley, 984 F.3d at 1242.
Id. at 1244.
Bryant v. Compass Grp. USA, Inc., 958 F.3d 617 (7th Cir. 2020).
Fox v. Dakkota Integrated Sys., LLC, 980 F.3d 1146 (7th Cir. 2020).
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self. 166 To further clarify the reasons for the opposite outcomes for the two
claims under section 15(a), the court went on to state that “allegations matter. One plaintiff may fail to allege a particularized harm to himself, while
another may assert one . . . . [T]he result of the standing inquiry for the
identical section of a statute will depend on what that section provides and
what the plaintiff has alleged.” 167
Clearview, the defendant in this case, had removed the case from state
court to federal court, and had then appealed the district court’s decision to
remand the case to state court; therefore, Clearview carried the burden of
convincing the Seventh Circuit court that the plaintiffs had alleged an injury
sufficient to establish federal standing. 168 With the aim of keeping the case
in federal court, Clearview urged the Seventh Circuit to view its sale of
biometric information as an injury-in-fact. 169 In reply, the court observed
that the sale of information may well constitute an injury-in-fact in a different complaint, where the plaintiff asserted some sort of harm. 170
After listing several examples of injuries that could plausibly be linked
to the sale of biometric data, the court concluded that “[w]ithout any such
allegations of concrete and particularized harm to the plaintiffs, we are left
with a general rule that prohibits the operation of a market in biometric
identifiers and information.” 171 The court analogized this general rule to the
Eagle Protection Act’s regulatory prohibition against buying and selling
eagles, eagle parts, eagle nests, or eagle eggs. 172 With that analogy in mind,
a section 15(c) violation only implicates a general duty similar to a company’s duty to make its schedule for retention and destruction of biometric
information available to the public—unless the plaintiff alleges a particularized injury caused by the sale of the data.173
Is it as simple as that? Can plaintiffs keep a putative class action out of
federal court merely by stating that the class they seek to represent only
includes people who have not suffered an injury from the statutory violation? The answer seems to be yes. The Seventh Circuit raised the question
of whether a district court might choose to take a broader view when the
proposed class is purposely narrowed in such a way, but stated that it had
“no reason to believe that the district court, acting on its own initiative,

166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.

Thornley, 984 F.3d at 1245.
Id. at 1246.
Id. at 1243-44.
Id. at 1247.
Id.
Thornley, 984 F.3d at 1247.
Id.
Id.
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would certify a different and broader class; to that extent, the rule that the
plaintiff controls her own case applies.” 174
And importantly, people who were excluded from this narrowly defined class would be free to sue Clearview if they wished to, either alone or
as a member of a class alleging an injury. 175 Therefore, the restriction imposed on this class would not implicate Standard Fire Insurance Co. v.
Knowles, where the Supreme Court held that a plaintiff could not keep a
proposed class action in state court by stipulating that the class would not
seek damages in excess of $5 million, because “a plaintiff who files a proposed class action cannot legally bind members of the proposed class before the class is certified.” 176 When the restriction on the proposed class
does not affect the legal rights of the members of the class, as in Thornley,
there is “nothing [to] prevent a putative class representative from taking a
conservative approach to class definition.” 177
In closing, the court noted that “[i]t is no secret to anyone that [the
plaintiffs] took care in their allegations, and especially in the scope of the
proposed class they would like to represent, to steer clear of federal court.
But in general, plaintiffs may do this.” 178 And though it observed that Illinois state courts permit BIPA complaints “that allege bare statutory violations, without any further need to allege or show injury,” 179 the Seventh
Circuit expressed “no opinion on the adequacy of Thornley’s complaint as a
matter of Illinois law. That will be for the state court to address.” 180
In a concurring opinion, Circuit Judge Hamilton emphasized the point
that the court’s conclusion hinged on the fact that the Thornley plaintiffs
tailored their claims and their description of the proposed class in very particular ways, and that “other plaintiffs might well establish [Article III]
standing for other alleged violations of Section 15(c)” 181—just as the court
found Article III standing for a section 15(a) claim in Fox, but not in Bryant.
Next, the concurrence turned to an apparent inconsistency in recent
decisions by the Seventh Circuit. 182 While the court had found federal
standing for plaintiffs alleging intangible harm caused by violations of
BIPA, the court had come to the opposite conclusion in recent decisions
174. Id. at 1247-48.
175. Id. at 1248.
176. Thornley, 984 F.3d at 1248 (quoting Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. Knowles, 568
U.S. 588, 593 (2013)).
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 1248-49 (citing Rosenbach v. Six Flags Ent. Corp., 129 N.E.3d 1197,
1203-04 (Ill. 2019)).
180. Id. at 1249.
181. Thornley, 984 F.3d at 1249 (Hamilton, J., concurring).
182. Id. at 1249-50.

310

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42-2

related to other consumer-protection statutes, such as the Fair Credit Reporting Act and the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. 183 After listing a
number of cases on each side, Judge Hamilton wrote, “I confess that I have
not yet been able to extract from these different lines of cases a consistently
predictable rule or standard.” 184
In the Spokeo case (also discussed in the Seventh Circuit’s Bryant and
Fox decisions), the Supreme Court held that, although an intangible injury
could satisfy the Article III requirement for a “concrete” injury, a “bare
procedural violation” could not. 185 Noting that numerous federal courts
subsequently concluded that plaintiffs had alleged only bare procedural
violations, Judge Hamilton highlighted the fact that the Supreme Court itself had offered only one example of what might constitute a bare procedural violation—one which appears to be “utterly trivial”: listing the wrong
zip code for a debtor, in violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act. 186
In Judge Hamilton’s view, the Seventh Circuit had taken Spokeo too
far in several recent opinions, considering the Supreme Court’s own reference point. 187 While lower federal courts had “spilled a great deal of ink”
over what might, or might not, constitute a bare procedural violation, 188
Judge Hamilton turned instead to the discussion in Spokeo of the power of
Congress to grant rights and define injuries that would provide a basis for
alleging a concrete harm. 189
Rather than focusing single-mindedly on the idea of a “bare procedural
allegation,” courts should give more “weight to Spokeo’s endorsement of
standing where Congress has chosen to provide procedural and informational rights to reduce the risk of more substantive harm for consumers . . .
and has created private rights of action to enforce them.” 190 To show the
implications of concluding too quickly that Spokeo would deny standing to
a plaintiff, Judge Hamilton pointed to the potential creation of a “federal
cousin” to BIPA. 191 If Congress were to provide for a private right of action
to address violations of the law, courts might undermine the legislation by
denying the existence of a concrete injury. 192 By extension, the courts
would be undermining “legislative discretion to enforce federal law through
private rights of action. The obvious alternative path for Congress [would]
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.

Id. at 1250.
Id.
Id. (quoting Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016)).
Thornley, 984 F.3d at 1250 (Hamilton, J., concurring).
Id. at 1251.
Id. at 1250.
Id. at 1251.
Id.
Thornley, 984 F.3d at 1251 (Hamilton, J., concurring).
Id.
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be to rely more heavily on enforcement through federal bureaucracies,
which [would] face no standing obstacles.” 193 In closing, Judge Hamilton
expressed his hope for the Supreme Court to “revisit the problem of standing in private actions based on intangible injuries under a host of federal
consumer-protection statutes.” 194
VI. CONCLUSION
In the years to come, advancements in technology are sure to broaden
both the possibilities for utilizing biometric information and the concerns
around biometric privacy. And while there is currently no federal law regulating biometric information, 195 a number of states have joined Illinois in
implementing legislation to protect biometric privacy, including Texas,
Washington, California, and New York. 196 Because BIPA is considered
“the leading statute for biometric litigation,” a number of states have looked
to BIPA as a model as they draft their own biometric privacy legislation,
with lawmakers in Maryland and South Carolina proposing bills with a
private right of action. 197 In contrast, the law in Texas can only be enforced
through the state’s attorney general. 198
The National Biometric Information Privacy Act of 2020 was introduced in Congress in August of that year; however, the bill died without
receiving a vote. 199 As the name suggests, the bill was closely modeled on
BIPA. 200 Like BIPA, the national law would have applied only to private
entities and would have been enforced through a private right of action,
with damages of $1,000 per negligent violation and $5,000 per intentional
or reckless violation. 201
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Alicia Baiardo & Anthony Le, U.S. Biometrics Laws Part I: An Overview of
2020, JD SUPRA (Feb. 1, 2021), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/u-s-biometrics-lawspart-i-an-overview-2275684/ [https://perma.cc/GLZ2-4CSU].
196. Kristine Argentine & Paul Yovanic, The Growing Number of Biometric Privacy
Laws and the Post-COVID Consumer Class Action Risks for Businesses, JD SUPRA (June 9,
2020),
https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/the-growing-number-of-biometric-privacy62648/ [https://perma.cc/9AME-QFWE].
197. Baiardo & Le, supra note 195.
198. Id.
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199. GOVTRACK,
[https://perma.cc/RW8S-VBN7].
200. Joseph J. Lazzarotti, National Biometric Information Privacy Act, Proposed by
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In the future, lawmakers in other states and in Congress will likely
continue to look to BIPA as they decide whether to enforce biometric privacy legislation through a private right of action. Those lawmakers may be
both cautioned and encouraged by the Seventh Circuit holdings regarding
Article III standing in Bryant, Fox, and Thornley.

